

**NSC BRIEFING**

**27 February 1958**

**INDONESIA**

- I. Djakarta has bombed and blockaded dissident strongholds in first effort to crush rebellion by all available means.
  - A. Attacks have knocked out rebel radios in Padang, Bukittinggi, and Manado which are still off the air.
- II. Decision to use force undoubtedly made by Sukarno with support of cabinet and Djuanda who foresees long struggle.
  - A. Concessions to dissidents unlikely.
- III. Sukarno gaining political support in Java among elements of Nahdlatul Ulama and National Party.
  - A. Commanders in Borneo, South Celebes, the Lesser Sundas, the Moluccas, and North Sumatra have declared their loyalty to Djakarta.
- IV. Sukarno scheduled to make important speech next Monday (3 March) in which he is expected to call for an early all out campaign to suppress the dissident movement.
  - A. He probably will attempt to whip up popular support by taking the line that rebellion is due primarily to Western intervention in Indonesian affairs, and may specifically accuse the US of aiding rebels.
- V. Nasution, who is loyal, planning airborne and amphibious action against Central Sumatra.

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- A. According to this plan, paratroopers (about 500 plus air lift capability available) would be dropped on oil centers of Pekanbaru and Renget in interior of Central Sumatra, while six army battalions would land on west coast to attack Padang and Bukittinggi.
  - B. One report states that troops, which could be used against Sumatra, are beginning to arrive in Djakarta.
  - C. This plan appears to be realistic, and Indonesians are probably capable of launching it, although they will have trouble maintaining their force once landed.
  - D. Two big problems facing Djakarta--aside from logistics--are:
    - 1. uncertain loyalty of many military units in Java, and
    - 2. fact that many troops now in Java are needed there to combat Darul Islam who may soon be joined by other anti-Sukarno elements.
- VI. Rebels have not received full support from other areas in Sumatra. However, Barlian in South Sumatra has stated that he will not permit govt troops to move through his command, and all political parties in his bailiwick on 26 February demanded the resignation of Djuanda cabinet.
- A. Atjehnese have made no move, but may attack Medan if govt troops initiate attack against Central Sumatra.
  - B. Pro-rebel forces in Java may attempt to assassinate Sukarno.
- VII. Makassar Straits incident--where Dutch destroyer seized Indonesian steamer which Dutch claimed fired on them--has sparked sharp reaction
- A. Djakarta has denounced incident as piracy which may be a "casus belli."

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